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Abstract
This Essay is an attempt to contribute to the scholarly investigation into how to reconcile the
complementary and competing goals of protecting national security in the interest of law enforce-
ment while still guaranteeing the protection of basic human rights of defendants. It focuses on
two issues - capital punishment and torture - which form the bases for state refusal to extradite
fugitives.
BASES FOR REFUSING INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION REQUESTS-CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND TORTURE
Ved P. Nanda*
I. THE PROBLEM
International extradition serves an important function by
providing a mechanism under which states cooperate with one
another by surrendering to the requesting state a fugitive ac-
cused or convicted of a crime committed within the territory of
the requesting state or having produced detrimental effects
there. The process, usually embodied in bilateral treaties, plays
a crucial role in international law enforcement and reflects the
common interest of the world community in prosecuting serious
crimes by ensuring that criminals do not find safe havens.
There is, however, an equally important complementary
and competing common interest in guaranteeing the protection
of basic human rights of defendants. The rapid development,
indeed transformation, of international human rights law in the
last four decades has lent credence and coherence to this special
interest by providing it with content and specificity and by ex-
tending its reach and scope. At the beginning of the new millen-
nium, individuals are able to invoke international and regional
human rights norms on a wide variety of subjects ranging from
the abolition of capital punishment and torture to the right to a
fair trial and other fundamental freedoms. There is, also, an in-
creasingly wider adherence by states who are parties to these
norms.
Equally important, the rise of international terrorism has re-
sulted in the strengthening of bilateral extradition treaties, espe-
cially in their exclusion of the political offense exception.' It is
logical to expect that these complementary goals of protecting
* Vice Provost, John Evans University Professor, and Director of the International
Legal Studies Program, University of Denver. This Essay is an adapted version of the
presentation at the symposium, entitled "International Law Enforcement, Extradition,
and Mutual Legal Assistance in the 21st Century," held at the Fordham University
School of Law on January 22, 2000, under the auspices of the Fordhain International
Law Journal and the Fordham International Criminal Law Center.
1. See, e.g., Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United King-
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national security and furthering international cooperation in the
interest of law enforcement on the one hand, and the protection
of defendants' human rights on the other hand might collide
and, in reality, they do. The problem of reconciling these com-
peting common interests has appropriately begun to receive
scholarly attention.2 This Essay is an attempt in furtherance of
that inquiry. It focuses on two important issues-capital punish-
ment and torture-which form the bases for state refusal to ex-
tradite fugitives.
II. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
In this section, I identify the challenge for the retentionist
states posed by the growing trend toward abolition of capital
punishment. Next, I present a survey of the current status of the
death penalty issue in the international arena. This will be fol-
lowed by a discussion of the emerging international legal norms
on the abolition of the death penalty, the work of pertinent in-
ternational and regional organizations, and state practices.
A. The Challenge
Due to a growing trend toward abolition of capital punish-
ment,3 retentionist states, such as the United States, encounter
resistance to their extradition requests from surrendering states
that have abolished the death penalty. Consequently, this situa-
tion results in one of the following three possible outcomes: (1)
letters from relevant legal representatives of the requesting state
giving assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed; (2)
bilateral extradition treaties explicitly including the promise
from the requesting state not to apply the death penalty after the
extradition; or (3) a refusal by the state to extradite. Indeed,
clauses providing for assurances have become commonplace as
part of model extradition treaties adopted by the United Nations
and other international organizations.'
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K., as amended,
T.I.A.S. No. 12050, 24 I.L.M. 1105 (1985).
2. See, e.g.,John Dugard & Christine Van Den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with
Human Rights, 92 Am. J. INT'L L. 187 (1998).
3. See WirLiAm A. ScHABAs, THE ABOLITON OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw (Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1997).
4. See, e.g. European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 11, 359
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B. The International Status of the Death Penalty
At the end of the twentieth century, over half of all coun-
tries in the world had abolished the death penalty in law or prac-
tice.5 Amnesty International reports that, in recent years, an av-
erage of two countries annually have abolished the death penalty
in law, or, having already done so for ordinary offenses, have
proceeded to abolish it for all offenses. The total of abolitionist
countries in law or practice stands at 106. This includes seventy
states that have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, thir-
teen that have abolished it for ordinary crimes but allow it for
exceptional crimes such as wartime crimes, and twenty-three
countries that are de facto abolitionists, for, while retaining the
death penalty for ordinary crimes, in practice they have not exe-
cuted anyone during the past decade or more, or have made an
international commitment not to carry out any executions.
6
Ninety countries are considered retentionist and, while most
have carried out executions during the past decade, the number
of countries which actually execute prisoners in any one year is
actually much smaller.'
U.N.T.S. 273, 282, E.T.S. 24 (1960); Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Feb.
25, 1981, art. 9, 20 I.L.M. 723, 724 (1981).
5. See Amnesty International, The Death Penalty-List of Abolitionist and Retentionist
Countries, ACT 50/01/99, Revised Dec. 18, 1999 (visited Apr. 4, 2000) <http://
Tvww.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/dp/abrelist.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal).
6. Id. The 70 states that have abolished the death penalty for all crimes are An-
dorra, Angola, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada,
Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Re-
public, East Timor, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece,
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kiribati, Liechten-
stein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia,
Moldova, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicara-
gua, Nonay, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Sdo
Tom6 and Principe, Seychelles, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Af-
rica, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Vatican
City State, and Venezuela. Id. The 13 that have abolished the death penalty for ordi-
nary crimes only are Argentina, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Cook Islands, Cy-
prus, El Salvador, Fiji, Israel, Latvia, Malta, Mexico, and Peru. Id. The 23 defacto aboli-
tionist states are Albania, Bermuda, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Central African Re-
public, Congo, Cote D'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gambia, Grenada, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali,
Nauru, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Togo, Tonga, Turkey,
and Western Samoa. Id.
7. Id. The 90 retentionist states are Afghanistan, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda,
Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Comoros, Democratic Republic
of Congo, Cuba, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
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C. Emerging International Legal Norms
Several international human rights treaties address the issue
of capital punishment. To illustrate, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights8 (or "Civil and Political Rights Cove-
nant"), adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966, pro-
claims in Article 6 "the inherent right to life" of every human
being. This article establishes restrictions and safeguards on the
death penalty in countries which have not abolished it. In such
countries, a "sentence of death may be imposed only for the
most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the
time of the commission of the crime .... This penalty can only
be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a com-
petent court."9 It explicitly states that a "[s]entence of death
shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant
women."'10 Nothing in the article "shall be invoked to delay or to
prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to
the [Covenant]."" In 1989, the U.N. General Assembly adopted
the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights12 (or "Second Optional Protocol") ac-
knowledging a worldwide effort to abolish capital punishment
Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Ka-
zakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi,
Malaysia, Mauritania, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pak-
istan, Palestinian Authority, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint
Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Somalia, South Korea, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan,
Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United States of America, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugosla-
via, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Id.
8. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 14, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 176-77, 6 I.L.M. 368, 372-73 (1967)
9. Id. art. 6(2), 6 I.L.M. at 370.
10. Id. art. 6(5), 6 I.L.M. at 370.
11. Id. art. 6(6), 6 I.L.M. at 370.
12. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 44th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 98, U.N. Doc. A/44/128 (1989) [hereinafter
Second Protocol]. As of November 20, 1999, there are 40 state parties to the Second
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at
the Abolition of the Death Penalty ("Second Protocol"), while three states have signed
but not yet ratified it. See also Amnesty International, Ratifications of International Treaties
on theDeath Penalty, ACT 50/03/98, Revised Nov. 20, 1999 (visited Apr. 6, 2000) <http:/
/www.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/dp/rats.htm> (on file with the Fordham International
Law Journal) [hereinafter Ratifications of International Treaties].
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for all purposes and obligating each state party to "take all neces-
sary measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdic-
tion. 13
The American Convention on Human Rights14 (or "Con-
vention") forbids capital punishment for "political offenses or re-
lated common crimes,""5 and prohibits the execution of "per-
sons who, at the time the crime was committed, were under
eighteen years of age or over seventy years of age" and pregnant
women.'6 The Convention mandates that "countries that have
not abolished the death penalty [may impose it] only for the
most serious crimes" and are not to extend such punishment "to
crimes to which it does not presently apply."' 7 It further man-
dates that the death penalty "shall not be reestablished in states
that have abolished it." s8 Subsequently, in 1990, the General As-
sembly of the Organization of American States adopted the Pro-
tocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish
the Death Penalty' 9 ("Protocol"). Referring to the recognition
of the right to life and restrictions on the application of the
death penalty in Article 4 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, the Protocol obligates states that are parties to it
not to "apply the death penalty in their territory to any person
subject to theirjurisdiction."2 ° The parties are, however, allowed
to declare at the time of ratification or accession that "they re-
serve the right to apply the death penalty in wartime in accord-
ance with international law, for extremely serious crimes of a
military nature."'"
The Convention on the Rights of the Child,2 adopted by
the U.N. General Assembly in 1989, obligates state parties to
13. Second Protocol, supra note 12, art. 1(2).
14. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
OA.S.T.S. No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
15. Id. art. 4(4), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 145.
16. Id. art. 4(5), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 146.
17. Id. art. 4(2), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 145.
18. Id. art. 4(3), 1144 U.N.T.S. at 145.
19. Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty, Organization of American States, OAS.T. No. 73 (1990), adopted by Res. 1042,
20th Sess., June 8, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1447 (1990).
20. Id. art. 1, 29 I.L.M. at 1448.
21. Id. art. 2, 29 I.L.M. at 1448.
22. Convention on the Rights of the Child, GA. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989), 28 I.L.M. 1448.
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"recognize that every child has the inherent right to life."23 It
also ensures that "[n]either capital punishment nor life impris-
onment without possibility of release shall be imposed for of-
fences committed by persons below eighteen years of age."24 No
"reservation incompatible with the object and purpose" of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child is allowed. 5
Europe remains in the forefront of the global movement to
abolish the death penalty. The European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 26 ("Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights"), which entered into
force in 1953, recognized capital punishment as an exception to
the right to life.2 7 Yet European states acknowledged in 1985
the trend toward abolition of capital punishment by adopting
Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention Concerning the Ab-
olition of the Death Penalty28 ("Protocol No. 6"). Protocol 6
calls for the abolition of the death penalty in times of peace,
explicitly stating that "[t]he death penalty shall be abolished.
No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed. ' 29 Its
preamble recalls the genesis of Protocol No. 6 in recognizing
that several member states of the Council of Europe exper-
ienced an evolution which "expresses a general tendency in
favor of abolition of the death penalty." While Protocol No. 6
allows the parties to impose death sentences for acts committed
in wartime or imminent threat of war,3" it does not permit any
reservation to its provisions. 3'
In 1994, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Eu-
23. Id. art. 6(1), 28 I.L.M. at 1460.
24. Id. art. 37, 28 I.L.M. at 1470.
25. Id. art. 51, 28 I.L.M. at 1475-76.
26. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].
27. Id. art. 2, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
28. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, E.T.S. 114,
entered into force Mar. 1, 1985, 22 I.L.M. 539 (1983) [hereinafter Protocol No. 6]. As
of November 20, 1999, there are 33 state parties to Protocol No. 6 to the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Aboli-
tion of the Death Penalty ("Protocol No. 6"). Ratifications of International Treaties, supra
note 12. Six states have signed but not yet ratified it. Ratifications of International Trea-
ties, supra.
29. Protocol No. 6, supra note 28, art. 1, 22 I.L.M. at 539.
30. Id. art. 2, 22 I.L.M. at 539.
31. Id. art. 4, 22 I.L.M. at 540.
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rope (or "Assembly") called upon Member States that had not
ratified Protocol No. 6 to do so, 3 2 and stated a willingness to rat-
ify Protocol No. 6 as a prerequisite for membership in the Coun-
cil of Europe. In a recommendation, the Assembly called upon
the Committee of Ministers to draft an additional protocol to
the European Convention on Human Rights. Under this proto-
col, the death penalty would be abolished both in peace and war-
time, and it would obligate the parties not to reintroduce it at
all.3" This recommendation proposed the establishment of a
control mechanism to obligate states, where the death penalty is
still permissible, to set up a commission for abolishing it. As the
proposed commission continued its work, a moratorium on all
executions would be in effect. Especially pertinent for this Essay
is a provision in the recommendation that binds all state parties
not to extradite any person to a state where he may be subject to
capital punishment and the extreme conditions on "death row."
Subsequently, the Assembly reaffirmed its opposition to the
death penalty and its earlier position regarding a moratorium on
executions and its willingness to ratify Protocol No. 6 as prereq-
uisites for all states joining the Council of Europe. 4 In October
1997, at the Second Summit of the Council of Europe, the
Heads of State or Government adopted a declaration on the
topic of capital punishment, with several leaders insisting upon
the importance of abolition of the death penalty as a central
human rights goal of the Council of Europe. 5
The European Union is also actively involved with the topic.
In October 1997 it adopted the Treaty of Amsterdam,36 which
32. EuP. PARL. Ass. REs. 1044 (1994) on the abolition of the death penalty in Eu-
rope, 25th sitting, Doc. 7154 (Oct. 4, 1994); see also William A. Schabas, International
Law and Abolition ofthe Death Penalty: Recent Developments, 4 LSAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 535,
554-58 (1998) (reporting on Council of Europe's activities aimed at abolition of death
penalty).
33. EuR. PARr.. Ass. RZcoMM. 1246 (1994) on the abolition of the death penalty in
Europe, 25th sitting (Oct. 4, 1994).
34. EuR. PAnt. RF-s. 1097 (1996) on the abolition of the death penalty in Europe,
24th sitting (June 28, 1996); see also EuR. PARL. RFCOMM. 1302 (1996) on the abolition
of the death penalty in Europe, 24th sitting (June 28, 1996); Schabas, supra note 32, at
556.
35. See Schabas, supra note 32, at 557.
36. Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. C
340/1 (1997) [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (amending Treaty on European
Union ("TEU"), Treaty establishing the European Community ("EC Treaty"), Treaty
2000] 1375
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underpins the abolition of the death penalty in all member
states of the European Union.3 7 The Treaty of Amsterdam en-
tered into force on May 1, 1999.38 In a declaration by the Presi-
dency on behalf of the European Union on the fiftieth Anniver-
sary of the Council of Europe, the particular importance at-
tached by the EU to Protocol No. 6 was especially underlined. 9
The declaration called upon all members of the Council of Eu-
rope "to abide by their commitment to establish moratoria on
executions, to be consolidated by complete abolition of the
death penalty."40
The European Parliament has also adopted resolutions and
declarations calling upon Member States to totally abolish the
death penalty and urging the United Nations to adopt a "bind-
ing decision imposing a general moratorium on the death pen-
alty. '41 Finally, on the occasion of the fiftieth Anniversary of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the European Union
declared that "[w]ith the entry into force of the Treaty of Am-
sterdam, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
will be a condition for accession to the European Union, and a
serious and persistent breach of these rights may lead to a sus-
pension of rights of a Member State. 4 2
As mentioned above, the U.N. General Assembly adopted
the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights in 1989. It should be noted, however,
that the movement at the United Nations to ban capital punish-
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC Treaty"), and Treaty es-
tablishing the European Atomic Energy Community ("Euratom Treaty") and renum-
bering articles of TEU and EC Treaty).
37. Id., OJ. C 340/1, at 145-72 (1997); see also Schabas, supra note 32, at 559;
Dorean Marguerite Koenig, A Death Penalty Primer Reviewing International Human Rights
Development & the ABA Resolution for a Moratorium on Capital Punishment in Order To Inform
Debates in U.S. State Legislatures, 4 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 513, 521-22 (1998).
38. Information on the Enty into Force of the Amsterdam Treaty, SpicEiis (EuR.), May 1,
1999, available in 1999 WL 9070014.
39. Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European Union on the 50th Anniversay
of the Council of Europe, Pesc/99/46, May 5, 1999 (visited Apr. 19, 2000) <http://eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/dgla/daily/05_99/pesc__99__46.htm> (on file with the Fordham Inter-
national Law Journal).
40. Id.
41. Schabas, supra note 32, at 558-59.
42. Declaration of the European Union on the Occasion of the 50th Anniversay of the Uni-
versal Declaration on Human Rights, Pesc/98/149, Dec. 10, 1998 (visited Apr. 19, 2000)
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgla/daily/12_98/pesc_98_1 4 9.htm> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal).
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ment worldwide has been underway since the late 1960s. In
1968, the General Assembly adopted a resolution declaring the
objective of gradually but progressively restricting the range of
offenses punishable by death.4' Since, however, there are still
many retentionist countries, the General Assembly has yet to
adopt a resolution calling for complete abolition of the death
penalty or even a global moratorium on executions.
In 1994, the U.N. General Assembly's Social, Humanitarian,
and Cultural Committee, by a vote of forty-four to thirty-six, with
seventy-four abstentions, rejected a draft General Assembly reso-
lution calling for a worldwide moratorium on capital punish-
ment and for a global ban on the death penalty by the year
2000. 4 At the fifty-fourth Session of the General Assembly, the
Third Committee took no action on another draft resolution
calling for a worldwide moratorium on executions. 45 The resolu-
tion's seventy-three co-sponsors were led by the European
Union, and its seventy-four opponents sponsoring amendments
were led by Egypt and Singapore. The opponents invoked Arti-
cle 2, paragraph 7, of the U.N. Charter, mandating non-interven-
tion in "matters which are essentially within the domestic juris-
diction of any State, ' 46 and affirmed that every State has an ina-
lienable right to choose its political, economic, social, and
cultural systems, without interference in any form by another
State. The two sides could not reach an agreement and no ac-
tion was taken, leaving open the possibility of raising the matter
again at the General Assembly at a subsequent session.
The U.N. Commission on Human Rights (or "UNCHR")
has, however, taken action at its last several sessions. At the
UNCHR's 1997 session, a resolution calling for a moratorium on
the death penalty and stating that the "abolition of the death
43. See Capital Punishment, Agenda Item 59, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
7243; see also Capital Punishment, G.A. Res. 2393, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
Res./2393 (XXIII) (1968).
44. See Request for the Inclusion of an Additional Item in the Agenda of the Forty-
Ninth Session, Capital Punishment, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Docs. A/49/234, A/
49/234/Add.1, A/49/234/A.2 (1994); see also Human Rights Questions, Capital Pun-
ishment, G.A. Third Comm., Agenda Item 100, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/49/SR.61
(1995); Schabas, supra note 32, at 545-48.
45. Question of the Death Penalty, GA. Third Comm., Agenda Item 116(a), 54th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/C.3/54/L.8/Rev.1 (1999).
46. U.N. CHARTER, June 26, 1945, art. 2(7), 59 Stat. 1031, 1037, T.S. No. 993, 3
Bevans 1153.
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penalty contributes to the enhancement of human dignity and
to the progressive development of human rights" was adopted by
a vote of twenty-seven in favor and eleven against, with fourteen
abstaining. 47 The resolution was further strengthened in 1998
by a call for a restriction of offenses for which the death penalty
could be imposed and a moratorium on executions, eventually
leading to the abolition of the death penalty.' Subsequently, at
its 1999 session, the Human Rights Commission urged all states
that still maintain the death penalty not to impose it for crimes
committed by a person below eighteen years of age or on a per-
son suffering from any form of mental disorder, not to execute
any person so long as any related legal procedure, at national or
international level, is pending, to restrict progressively the
number of offenses for which the death penalty may be imposed,
and to establish a moratorium on executions, with a view to abol-
ishing completely the death penalty.49
Another promising development was the call in November
1999 by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
("African Commission") for a moratorium on executions.50 At
its meeting in Kigali, Rwanda, this commission urged
all States parties to the African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights that still maintain the death penalty to comply
fully with their obligations under the treaty and to ensure that
persons accused of crimes for which the death penalty is a
competent sentence are afforded all the guarantees in the Af-
rican Charter.
It further called upon all state parties that still maintain the
death penalty to "a) limit the imposition of the death penalty
only to the most serious crimes; b) consider establishing a mora-
torium on executions, especially in cases where there may not
have been full compliance with international standards for a fair
trial; and c) reflect on the possibility of abolishing the death
47. Question of the Death Penalty, Commission on Human Rights Resolution
1997/12, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1997/12 (1997).
48. Question of the Death Penalty, Commission on Human Rights, Draft Resolu-
tion, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/L.12 (1998).
49. Question of the Death Penalty, Commission on Human Rights Resolution
1999/61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1999/61 (1999). Res. 1999/61, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1999/61 (Apr. 28, 1999).
50. See Amnesty International, Death Penalty News, ACT 53/05/99, Dec. 99 (visited
Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.amnesty.org/alib/aipub/1999/AT/5300599.htni> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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penalty." 1
D. The Work of International and Regional Organizations and
State Practice
The trend toward abolition of the death penalty notwith-
standing, there is not sufficient state practice and opiniojuris for
the abolition of the death penalty that has developed as custom-
ary international law. Thus, a general proposition prohibiting
extradition to a country still retaining capital punishment can-
not be maintained. It is worth noting, however, that the entire
European region has taken a strong stand on the issue. Conse-
quently, the United States faces resistance from several countries
in Europe to its extradition requests. More specifically, case law
from the European Commission of Human Rights and Court of
Human Rights is evolving. Another abolitionist state, Canada,
which permits the death penalty only in the case of certain mili-
tary offenses, has also developed a rich jurisprudence on extradi-
tion in capital cases. In addition, the U.N. Committee on
Human Rights (or "Committee") has addressed the question on
various occasions. A brief discussion of a few selected decisions
by these bodies follows.
1. The U.N. Committee on Human Rights
The Committee, established under Article 28 of the Civil
and Political Rights Covenant, has had several occasions to ad-
dress the subject of capital punishment in situations involving
requests for extradition. Since the Committee's function is re-
lated to parties' compliance with the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant, the specific issues it has addressed in the context of
extradition are: (1) whether extradition of an individual to a
country where he or she would face the death penalty would
constitute violation by the sending state of its obligations under
the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, and (2) whether the
"death row phenomenon" is in itself a violation of the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant. A few complaints under the Second
Optional Protocol procedure and the Committee's views on a
few other communications will be discussed here.
In Kindler v. Canada,52 the fugitive, who was extradited by
51. Id.
52. Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/G/48/D/
137920001
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Canada to the United States, claimed that the decision to extra-
dite him violated several articles of the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant, including Articles 6 and 7, since he was likely to be
executed in the United States. The Committee held that Article
6 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant did not prohibit capi-
tal punishment but, as Article 6(2) restricted the circumstances
in which capital punishment might be imposed. In other words,
if Kindler "had been exposed, through extradition from Canada,
to a real risk of violation of Article 6, paragraph 2, in the United
States, that would have entailed a violation by Canada of its obli-
gations under Article 6, paragraph 1."5
The pertinent facts were that Joseph Kindler, a citizen of
the United States, was convicted of capital murder and kidnap-
ping by a court in Pennsylvania, where executions were carried
out by lethal injection. He was sentenced to death by ajury, but
prior to sentencing he escaped from custody and fled to Canada.
The United States sought his extradition. The 1976 Canada-
United States Extradition Treaty states that Canada may refuse
extradition unless the United States provides sufficient assur-
ances that "the death penalty shall not be imposed, or if imposed
shall not be executed."54
Kindler requested Canada to seek those assurances from the
United States. The Canadian Minister of Justice declined to do
so, and Kindler lost on appeal to the Federal Court. Further
appeals to the Court of Appeal and eventually to the Supreme
Court of Canada were rejected and he was extradited to the
United States.55 He then submitted his communication to the
Committee.
The Committee first decided that the communication
470/1991 (1993), 98 I.L.R. 426 (1994); see also Kindler v. Canada, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 779
(Can.).
53. Kindler, 98 I.L.R. at 446.
54. Extradition Treaty, Dec. 3, 1971, U.S.-Canada, art. 6, 27 U.S.T. 983, 989 [here-
inafter U.S.-Canada Extradition Treaty]. This states that:
when the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the laws of the requesting State and the laws of the requested State do
not permit such punishment for that offence, extradition may be refused un-
less the requesting State provides such assurances as the requested State con-
siders sufficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or if imposed,
shall not be executed.
Id.
55. See Kindler, 98 I.L.R at 430-31 (outlining facts of this case).
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might raise issues under Articles 6 and 7 of the Civil and Political
Rights Covenant and hence found it admissible. On the merits,
it referred to its prior General Comments on Article 6, under
which the parties are obliged to limit the use of the death pen-
alty and which point to the desirability of abolition of the death
penalty. The Committee also acknowledged the trend toward
abolition and the evolution of international law in this regard.5"
The Committee read Article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, to-
gether, and said, as to the claim under Article 6:
Canada itself did not impose the death penalty on Mr. Kin-
dler, but extradited him to the United States, where he faced
capital punishment. If Mr. Kindler had been exposed,
through extradition from Canada, to a real risk of a violation
of Article 6, paragraph 2, in the United States, that would
have entailed a violation by Canada of its obligations under
Article 6, paragraph 1. Among the requirements of Article 6,
paragraph 2, is that capital punishment be imposed only for
the most serious crimes, in circumstances not contrary to the
Covenant and other instruments, and that it be carried out
pursuant to a finaljudgment rendered by a competent court.
The Committee notes that Mr. Kindler was convicted of pre-
meditated murder, undoubtedly a very serious crime. He was
over 18 years of age when the crime was committed. The au-
thor has not claimed before the Canadian courts or before
the committee that the conduct of the trial in the Penn-
sylvania court violated his rights to a fair hearing under Arti-
cle 14 of the Covenant.
5 7
The Committee further observed that the Canadian courts
had undertaken extensive proceedings before extraditing Kin-
dler, reviewing all of the evidence submitted concerning his trial
and conviction. Consequently, it held that Canada's obligations
arising under Article 6 did not require Canada to refuse Kin-
dler's extradition. As Canada had promised to exercise its dis-
cretion to seek assurances under "exceptional circumstances"
and had given careful consideration before deciding not to seek
such assurances in this case, the Committee held that Article 6
did not "necessarily require Canada to refuse to extradite or to
seek assurances." 8 Since the decision to extradite without assur-
56. Id. at 445.
57. Id at 446.
58. Id. at 446-47.
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ances was not taken by Canada "arbitrarily or summarily," in the
light of the reasons given by Canada-"the absence of excep-
tional circumstances, the availability of due process, and the im-
portance of not providing a safe haven for those accused of or
found guilty of murder"-the Committee held that Canada did
not violate its obligations under Article 6.
Addressing the "death row" phenomenon associated with
capital punishment and whether it constituted a violation under
Article 7, the Committee referred to its prior jurisprudence that
"prolonged periods of detention under a severe custodial regime
cannot generally be considered to constitute cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment if the convicted person is merely availing
himself of appellate remedies." 9 It reiterated that "the facts and
the circumstances of each case need to be examined to see
whether an issue under Article 7 arises."60 The relevant factors
would include the author's personal aspects, the specific condi-
tions of his detention on death row, and the proposed method
of execution. The Committee distinguished the facts of the
judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Soering v.
United Kingdom,6 which is discussed below, 62 and held that no
violation under Article 7 had occurred. It should also be noted
that there were several individual dissenting opinions conclud-
ing that Canada was in violation of its obligations under Article
6.63
In a companion case from Canada, Ng v. Canada,64 the au-
thor of the communication was a British subject born in Hong
Kong and arrested in Canada. The United States requested his
extradition to stand trial in California on charges that included
twelve counts of murder for which, if convicted, he faced a possi-
ble death sentence. In California, executions were carried out
by means of asphyxiation in a gas chamber. After a Canadian
court decided that Ng was subject to extradition, the Minister of
Justice of Canada ordered that he should be extradited and de-
59. Id. at 447.
60. Id.
61. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 98 I.L.R. 270
(1989).
62. See infra notes 81-93.
63. Kindler v. Canada, 98 I.L.R. 426, 451-72 (1994).
64. Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991,, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/
469/1991 (1994), 98 I.LR. 473 (1994).
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termined not to seek assurances from the United States that he
would not be executed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Can-
ada held that extradition in those circumstances was lawful. In
his communication to the Committee, Ng claimed that Canada's
decision to extradite him violated several articles of the Civil and
Political Rights Covenant, including Articles 6 and 7. Specifi-
cally on Article 7, he contended that California's means of exe-
cution constituted inhuman and degrading treatment or punish-
ment, contrary to the Covenant's Article 7. Similarly, he claimed
that the conditions on death row in California violated Article 7.
Rejecting Canada's argument that the communication
should be declared inadmissible, the Committee considered the
admissibility issue together with its examination of the merits of
the case.65 It held, on the same rationale as in the Kindler com-
munication, that there was no violation of Article 6. As to the
claim under Article 7, however, the Committee held that execu-
tion by gas asphyxiation did constitute a violation. It stated that:
by definition, every execution of a sentence of death may be
considered to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment within
the meaning of Article 7 of the Covenant; on the other hand,
Article 6, paragraph 2, permits the imposition of capital pun-
ishment for the most serious crimes. Nonetheless, the Com-
mittee reaffirms as it did in its General Comment 20[44] on
Article 7 of the covenant (CCPR/C/21/Add.3, paragraph 6)
that, when imposing capital punishment, the execution of the
sentence "... must be carried out in such a way as to cause
the least possible physical and mental suffering."
66
On the basis of the information provided to the Commit-
tee-that "execution by gas asphyxiation may cause prolonged
suffering and agony and does not result in death as swiftly as
possible, as asphyxiation by cyanide gas may take over 10 min-
utes"-it concluded that such execution would not meet the test
of "least possible physical and mental suffering," and thus consti-
tutes cruel and inhuman treatment, in violation of Article 7.67
Consequently, the Committee held that, since Canada could rea-
sonably foresee that, if sentenced to die, Ng would be executed
by these means, which amounted to a violation of Article 7, Can-
65. I. at 487.
66. Id. at 503.
67. Id. at 504.
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ada had "failed to comply with its obligations under the Cove-
nant, by extraditing Mr. Ng without having sought and received
assurances that he would not be executed."68
In Reid v. Jamaica,69 Reid, the author of the communication
and a Jamaican citizen, was charged with murder in the course
of an armed robbery, convicted, and sentenced to die in 1985.
His appeal was dismissed in 1986. He claimed that the imposi-
tion of the death sentence, in the way in which it was imposed,
was a violation of Article 6 and that the delay in the sentence of
death amounted to cruel and inhuman punishment in violation
of Article 7. After declaring the communication admissible in
March 1989, the Committee held inJuly 1990 that since Reid was
denied effective representation at the appellate proceedings and
since no further appeal against the sentence was available, a vio-
lation of Article 6 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant had
occurred.7 ° It said that legal assistance must be made available
to a convicted prisoner under the sentence of death both at the
trial in the court of first instance and in all appellate proceed-
ings. 71 The Committee referred to its prior General Comment
6[16]. This had stated that the Civil and Political Rights Cove-
nant's mandate that a sentence of death may be imposed only in
accordance with the law and not contrary to the provisions of the
Civil and Political Rights Covenant implies that "the procedural
guarantees therein prescribed must be observed, including the
right to a fair hearing by an independent tribunal, the presump-
tion of innocence, the minimum guarantees for the defence,
and the right to review by a higher tribunal."72
Since in this case the requirements for fair trial were not
met, the Committee concluded that the right protected under
Article 6 had been violated. As to the Article 7 claim, the Com-
mittee reiterated its earlier views that "prolonged judicial pro-
ceedings do not per se constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment even if they can be a source of mental strain for con-
victed prisoners."7  Acknowledging, however, that the situation
68. Id.
69. Reid v. Jamaica, Communication No. 250/1987, U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee, July 20, 1990, 98 I.L.R. 357 (1994).
70. Id. at 366-67.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 367.
73. Id.
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may be different in cases involving capital punishment and
knowing that it would be necessary to assess the circumstances of
each case, the court nevertheless did not find a violation of Arti-
cle 7.74
In Wright v. Jamaica,75 the Committee found that since the
final sentence of death was given without legal representation
for the preliminary hearing, without due respect for the require-
ment that an accused be tried without undue delay, and since
there was no effective representation on appeal, there was conse-
quently a violation of Article 6 of the Civil and Political Rights
Covenant. Similar views have been expressed by the court in
other cases, as well.76 In another complaint involving Jamaica,
Peart v. Jamaica, the Committee reiterated its views on a state's
obligation to meet the fair trial requirements contained in the
Civil and Political Rights Covenant's Article 14 in a capital case:
The imposition of a sentence of death upon conclusion of a
trial in which the provision of the Covenant have not been
respected constitutes, if no further appeal against the sen-
tence is possible, a violation of article 6. The provision that a
death sentence may be imposed only in accordance with the
law and not contrary to the provisions of the Covenant im-
plies that the procedural guarantees therein prescribed must
be preserved, including the right to a fair hearing by an in-
dependent tribunal, the presumption of innocence, the mini-
mum guarantees for the defence, and the right to review of
conviction and sentence by a higher tribunal.77
As to what is meant by the most serious crime under Article
6, paragraph 2 of the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, in 1995
the Committee expressed its view in a complaint involving
Zambia. In that case, the complainant had been sentenced to
death for aggravated robbery when no one had been either
killed or wounded. The Committee decided that the mandatory
imposition of the death penalty under these circumstances was
74. Id.
75. Wright v.Jamaica, Communication No. 459/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/
459/1991, 1 10.6 (1995).
76. See Markus G. Schmidt, Universality of Human Rights and the Death Penal--The
Approach of the Human Rights Committee, 3 IISAJ. INT'L & COMp. L. 477, 481-82 (1997).
77. Peart v. Jamaica, Communications Nos. 464/1991 & 482/1991 (Peart v. Ja-
maica), views adopted on July 19, 1995 at 44, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/54/D/464/1991 &
482/1991 (1995).
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incompatible with Article 6, paragraph 2.78
Finally, the Committee's comments on the report of the
United States and criticizing the application of the death penalty
are noteworthy. The Committee expressed concern:
about the excessive number of offences punishable by the
death penalty in a number of States, the number of death
sentences handed down by the courts, and the long stays on
death row which, in specific instances, may amount to a
breach of article 7 of the Covenant. It deplores the recent
expansion of the death penalty under federal law and the re-
establishment of the death penalty in certain states. It also
deplores provisions in the legislation of a number of states
which allow the death penalty to be pronounced for crimes
committed by persons under 18 and the actual instances
where such sentences have been pronounced and executed.
It also regrets that, in some cases, there appears to have been
lack of protection from the death penalty of those mentally
retarded.79
2. The European Commission of Human Rights and the
European Court of Human Rights
These two bodies have considered limitations on extradition
based upon death row conditions. Through case law they have
developed jurisprudence on the often miserable conditions of
detention pending execution-the "death row phenomenon"-
as conceivably violating human rights of convicts. While the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights permits limitations on the
right to life, and thus allows for the death penalty in specified
circumstances, ° Article 3 contains a prohibition against inhu-
man and degrading treatment. This latter provision has been
applied against death row conditions in prisons of the United
States, most notably in Soering v. United Kingdom.8 ' In that case,
the accused Soering, a German national arrested in Great Brit-
ain, was charged with murder in Virginia and faced the death
78. Lubuto v. Zambia, Communication No. 390/1990, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/55/D/
390/1990/Rev.1 (1995).
79. Annual Report of the Human Rights Committee, UN GAOR, Vol. 1, Annex I,
at 54, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (1995).
80. See European Convention, supra note 26, § 1, art. 2 (permitting limitations on
right to life).
81. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.1t (ser. A) (1989), 98 I.L.R. 270
(1989).
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penalty if extradited to the United States and convicted in Vir-
ginia.
In an earlier case, Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, 2 the Commis-
sion had found inadmissible the application for a finding that
detention on California's death row was inhuman and degrad-
ing. The reason was that the applicant had not sufficiently
demonstrated that the conditions were covered by the terms of
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which
states that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment." 3 In Soering, however,
the European Court of Human Rights' examination of the cir-
cumstances did indeed lead to the conclusion that the United
Kingdom would be in violation of its European Convention on
Human Rights obligation to protect Soering's human rights if it
extradited the accused. The court considered four factors that
contributed to its decision, primarily the length of time likely to
be spent by an inmate in detention before his execution and the
conditions on death row themselves. The court also considered
Soering's age, his mental state, and the possibility of his extradi-
tion to Germany rather than the United States for prosecution.
The court said that the meaning of "inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment" will depend upon all the circum-
stances of the case. It added that "[i]nherent in the whole of the
Convention is a search for a fair balance between the demands
of the general interest of the community and the requirements
of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. '8 4 It
responded to the U.K. charge that, while the possible punish-
ment to be imposed upon Soering was, in the final analysis, un-
certain, the "common and legitimate interest of all States in
bringing fugitive criminals to justice" should require "a very high
degree of risk, proved beyond reasonable doubt, that ill-treat-
ment will actually occur" before the court would allow refusal of
the extradition.85 However, although the United Kingdom was
not ultimately responsible for the actions of the Virginia authori-
ties, the court stated, it was still responsible as a party within its
own obligations under Article 8 "for all and any foreseeable con-
82. See Kirkwood v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88, 37 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 158 (1984).
83. European Convention, supra note 26, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
84. Soering, 98 I.L.R. at 302-03.
85. Id. at 299.
13872000]
1388 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 23:1369
sequences of extradition suffered outside [its] jurisdiction."16
The court said:
It is not normally for the Convention institutions to pro-
nounce on the existence or otherwise of potential violations
of the Convention. However, where an applicant claims that
a decision to extradite him would, if implemented, be con-
trary to Article 3 by reason of its foreseeable consequences in
the requesting country, a departure from this principle is nec-
essary, in view of the serious and irreparable nature of the
alleged suffering risked, in order to ensure the effectiveness
of the safeguard provided by that Article....
In sum, the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a fugi-
tive may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence en-
gage the responsibility of that State under the Convention,
where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that
the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment in the requesting country. The establishment of
such responsibility inevitably involves an assessment of condi-
tions in the requesting country against the standards of Arti-
cle 3 of the Convention. Nonetheless, there is no question of
adjudicating on or establishing the responsibility of the re-
ceiving country, whether under general international law,
under the Convention or otherwise. In so far as any liability
under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is liability in-
curred by the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its
having taken action which has as a direct consequence the
exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment.8 7
Recognizing that an appreciable amount of the extended
time in detention was often accountable to a convict himself, the
court noted, however, that
just as some lapse of time between sentence and execution is
inevitable if appeal safeguards are to be provided to the con-
demned person, so it is equally part of human nature that the
person will cling to life by exploiting those safeguards to the
full. However well-intentioned and even potentially benefi-
cial is the provision of the complex of post-sentence proce-
dures in Virginia, the consequence is that the condemned
prisoner has to endure for many years the conditions on
death row and the anguish and mounting tension of living in
86. Id. at 301.
87. Id. at 303.
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the ever-present shadow of death.88
Noting the severity of the conditions that inmates often suffer in
such detention for an average of six to eight years, 9 regardless
that such extended time was often "largely of the prisoner's own
making,"9 0 the court found that Britain's extradition of Soering
to the United States without firm assurances that the death pen-
alty would not be applied would violate the Great Britain's obli-
gations under Article 3.
The court's position is worth quoting:
It would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of
the Convention, that "common heritage of political tradi-
tions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law" to which the pre-
amble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surren-
der a fugitive to another State where there were substantial
grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture, however heinous the crime allegedly
committed. Extradition in such circumstances, while not ex-
plicitly referred to in the brief and general wording of Article
3, would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of
the Article, and in the Court's view this inherent obligation
not to extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive
would be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of expo-
sure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment pro-
scribed by that Article.9 1
Subsequently, the U.K. government received the needed assur-
ances, Soering was extradited and convicted, but no death pen-
alty was imposed.9 2 In a concurring opinion Judge de Meyer
went further in expressing his view that extradition from an abo-
litionist state to a retentionist state will per se violate the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights obligations. In his words,
In the circumstances of the present case, the applicant's ex-
tradition to the United States would subject him to the risk of
being sentenced to death, and executed, in Virginia... for a
crime for which that penalty is not provided by the law of the
United Kingdom.
When a person's right to life is involved, no requested
88. Id. at 310.
89. Id. at 311.
90. Id. at 310.
91. Id. at 302.
92. See Richard B. Lilich, The Soering Case, 85 Am. J. ITr'L L. 128, 141 (1991).
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State can be entitled to allow a requesting State to do what
the requested State is not itself allowed to do.
If, as in the present case, the domestic law of a State does
not provide the death penalty for the crime concerned, that
State is not permitted to put the person concerned in a posi-
tion where he may be deprived of his life for that crime at the
hands of another State.95
It should, however, be noted that this viewpoint has not found
support among other judges on the court.
Since the Soering case, the European Commission on
Human Rights has, in several cases, interpreted the Soeingjudg-
ment. No major departure, however, has been reached from the
reasoning and outcome of that decision.94
3. State Practice
Canada and several countries in Europe have addressed the
death penalty issue in connection with requests from the United
States to extradite the fugitive. Initially, as mentioned earlier,
the Canadian Supreme Court in Kindler and Ng95 had stated that
extradition to face the death penalty is not a violation of the
Canadian Charter. Hence extradition to the United States, even
without assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed
or executed, was allowed. In a later case, U.S. v. Burns and
Rafay,96 however, the British Columbia Court of Appeal over-
ruled the Canadian Minister ofJustice's decision authorizing ex-
tradition in a capital case without seeking an assurance from the
United States that capital punishment would not be imposed.97
Burns and Rafay, both Canadians and eighteen years of age
at the time of the crime, murdered Rafay's parents and sister in
the State of Washington in the United States, after which they
fled to Canada. The state charged them with aggravated first
degree murder, which is a capital crime. The majority said that
since Burns' and Rafay's return to Canada would be impossible if
93. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 98 I.L.R. 270,
319-20 (1989) (de Mayer, J., concurring).
94. See Schabas, supra note 32, at 563-65.
95. Ngv. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/
1991 (1994), 98 I.L.R 473 (1994).
96. United States of America v. Bums and Rafay, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 524, 536
(B.C.CA).
97. See Schabas, supra note 32, at 567-70.
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they were put to death, a right granted to them under Section
6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights of Freedom, which states
that "Every citizen of Canada has the right to enter, remain in
and leave Canada,"98 they should not be extradited. In the
words ofJustice Donald, who wrote for the majority, " [b]y hand-
ing over the applicants to the American authorities without an
assurance, the Minister will maximally, not minimally, impair the
applicants' rights of citizenship."99 The case is pending before
the Canadian Supreme Court. In March 1999, the court heard
the arguments.100 However, as one of the nine justices subse-
quently retired and the chiefjustice was to retire shortly thereaf-
ter, in October 1999 the court called for another hearing in the
case.' 0' Further delays have occurred.10 2
In The Netherlands v. Short,'08 the district court at The Hague
enjoined The Netherlands from delivering the defendant, a U.S.
serviceman, to U.S. authorities before negotiating with them a
guarantee that the death penalty would not be imposed. 10 4
Short had confessed to murdering his wife. If extradited to the
United States, he would be then subject to the death penalty
under the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice. On appeal by
The Netherlands, the court of appeal overruled the district
court. On further appeal to the supreme court, the Advocate
General gave an opinion on the dilemma faced by The Nether-
lands insofar as there were two incompatible treaty obligations
contained in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO")
Status of Forces Agreement 01 ("Status Agreement") on the one
hand and the European Convention on Human Rights and its
Protocol No. 6 on the other.
In that opinion, the Advocate General discussed the NATO
Status Agreement, under which the primary right to exercise ju-
risdiction over Short was with the United States as the sending
98. Constitution Act 1982, C.R.C., ch. 6, § 1 (1982) (Can.).
99. Schabas, supra note 32, at 568.
100. Canada Court Considers Extradition, SF.ATr Tnims, Mar. 23, 1999, at B4.
101. Louis T. Corsaletti, Canadian High Court Calls for New Hearing in Rafay Case-
Two Charged with '94 Bellevue Slayings, STrAT TiMES, Oct. 26, 1999, at B1.
102. Louis T. Corsaletti, New Delay in Rafay-Burns Extradition, SEATTE TInMS, Feb. 9,
2000, at B1.
103. The Netherlands v. Short, 29 I.L.M. 1375 (1990) (Neth.).
104. Id. at 1378.
105. The North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19,
1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
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state, since the alleged crime was exclusively directed against the
person of a member of the serviceman's family. He further dis-
cussed the reach of the European Convention on Human Rights
and the Optional Protocol and its legislative history, the Soering
judgment, and Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Trea-
ties,11 under which there is no ranking between treaties, and
opined that the NATO Status Agreement does not provide a di-
rectly applicable rule, whereas the European Convention on
Human Rights, Articles 2 and 3, combined with Article 1 of Pro-
tocol No. 6, are directly applicable rules, and hence the latter
should prevail. 107 Thus he concluded that The Netherlands
should not hand over Short. The court followed his opinion,
overruled the court of appeal, and granted the injunction, af-
firming the decision of the district court."'
Similarly, the Swiss court in the case of Dharmarajah,°9
which involved a request from the Sri Lankan government for
extradition of a Tamil fugitive, obtained not only a guarantee
that the death penalty would not be imposed but also several
other assurances, including a promise to accord to Dharmarajah
the rights enumerated in the European Convention on Human
Rights. Even then, the Swiss refused to extradite him.
The French Conseil d'Etat considered the issue in connec-
tion with a request by Turkey for the extradition of a fugitive for
murder and attempted murder in Fidan.10 In light of Protocol
No. 6, the court held that it would be contrary to French ordre
public to extradite Fidan since any guarantees given by the Turk-
ish government, required under the extradition treaty, would
not be binding upon the independent courts."1
In May 1999, the French Supreme Court rejected an appeal
by U.S. fugitive Ira Einhorn, who was convicted in Philadelphia
for the murder of his girlfriend in 1977, setting the stage for his
extradition to the United States. 1 1 2 He fled the United States in
106. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
39/27 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
107. Id. at 1386.
108. Id. at 1389.
109. See Dharmarajah v. Ministere Public Federal, Arrets du Tribunal Federal
Suisse [ATF] 107 Tb 68 (1981), cited in GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL FuGTrw OF-
FENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAw-ExTRADmoN AND OTHER MECHANIsMs 167-68 (1998).
110. See Fidan, 100 I.L.R 662 (1997), cited in GILBERT, supra note 109, at 167.
111. See Fidan, 100 I.L.R_ at 663-64.
112. See French Court Rejects Appeal on Extradition, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1999, at A18;
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1981, shortly before his trial in Pennsylvania, and was later tried,
convicted, and sentenced in absentia to life in prison. After many
years, Einhorn was found and arrested in France, which guaran-
tees a new trial for a suspect convicted in absentia, since convic-
dons in absentia violate principles of the European Convention
on Human Rights and are not valid under French law. The
French Court of Appeals, without any explanation, decided to
free Einhorn.113  Subsequently, the Pennsylvania legislature
passed a law allowing for new trials under certain circumstances
for persons tried and sentenced in absentia. A second round of
his arrest by French authorities and the U.S. request for extradi-
tion followed. The French Appeals Court agreed to his extradi-
tion on the condition that he would be tried again in Philadel-
phia and the death penalty would not be imposed if he was con-
victed.
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In 1997, the Italian Constitutional Court faced a challenge
by Pietro Venezia to the Italian Ministry of Justice's decree per-
mitting him to be extradited to the United States where he was
under indictment for murder in Florida. The court in Venezia v.
Ministero di Grazia & Giustizia"15 looked beyond the question of
sufficiency of the assurances given in a note verbale by the U.S.
Department of State, through its Embassy in Rome, that the
death penalty would not be imposed or inflicted upon Venezia,
to find that the statutes on which the Italian government would
have proceeded to extradite him" 6 were in fact unconstitu-
see also Steven Levy, GettingAway with It, NEWvsVEEK, Dec. 15, 1997, at 58; David Usborne,
Hunt for the Unicorn, INDFPENDENT (LONDON), Feb. 13, 1999, at 12; Matthew W. Hen-
ning, Extradition Controversies: How Enthusiastic Prosecutions Can Lead to International Inci-
dents, 22 B.C. INT'L & Comp. L. Rnv. 347, 367-72 (1999).
113. See Levy, supra note 112, at 60.
114. See Anne Swardson, French Court Allows Extradition of Fugitive in U.S. Killing,
WASH. PosT, Feb. 19, 1999, at A17.
115. Venezia v. Ministero di Grazia e Giustizia, Corte coste, 27 June 1996, 79
RrVSTA Di Diurrro INTERNAZiONA" 815 (1996); Andrea Bianchi, US.-Italy Extradition
Treat)-Challenge Regarding Constitutionality-Protection of Fundamental Human Rights, In-
cluding Right to Life-Prohibition of Death Penalty in Requested Party's Constitution-Inadmis-
sibility of Assurances That Death Penalty Shall Be Imposed or Enforced, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 727
(1997).
116. Id. at 727-28. Article 698 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure and the
Italian domestic statute incorporating Article IX of the U.S.-Italy Extradition Treaty
both provide that:
[W]hen the offense for which extradition is requested is punishable by death
under the laws of the requesting Party, extradition shall be refused, unless the
requesting Party provides such assurances as the requested Party considers suf-
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tional. The Italian Constitution protects fundamental human
rights and prohibits the death penalty.
17
Venezia had first appealed the Ministry ofJustice's decree to
the Court of Cassation, which held that the U.S. assurances were
appropriate and sufficient. Thus, in the court's words, in these
circumstances, "[T] he sanction of the death penalty is non-exis-
tent or, at least, non-effective." 118 The Constitutional Court,
which finally considered the matter, ruled that under no circum-
stances would Italy extradite an individual to a country where
the death penalty exists. The relevant issue for the court's con-
sideration was whether the assurances of the requesting state
were adequate to protect the values enshrined in the Italian
Constitution. Under the Italian Constitution, the ideal of the
right to life is preeminent and requires absolute protection. It
states in Article 2 that "[t]he Republic recognizes and guaran-
tees the inviolable rights of man, both as an individual and as a
member of the social groups in which one's personality finds ex-
pression, and it requires the performance of imperative political,
economic, and social duties."" 9 Under article 27, paragraph 4,
"[t]he death penalty is not admitted save in cases specified by
military laws in time of war."1
2 0
E. Appraisal
With the adoption of Protocol No. 6 and the Second Op-
tional Protocol to the Civil and Political Rights Covenant, state
practice is much more demanding of assurances that the death
penalty will not be imposed prior to allowing extradition to the
United States. Even Canada, which has traditionally not consid-
ered assurances from the United States necessary for extradition
purposes, is now likely to demand such assurances.
III. TORTURE
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights
clearly demonstrates that extradition will be refused if there is a
ficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be
executed.
Id. at 727.
117. CosT. arts. 2, 27 (It.).
118. Bianchi, supra note 115, at 729.
119. Id. at 728 n.2, citing CosT. art. 2 (It.).
120. id, citing Cosr. art. 27(4) (It.).
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND TORTURE
real risk that the fugitive, if surrendered, will be subject to tor-
ture. The rationale is that the 1984 U.N. Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment 21 prohibits the extradition as well as the deporta-
tion of a person to a state "where there are substantial grounds
for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture"'122 and allows no derogation. Hence, the seminal case
on torture is a deportation case, Chahal v. United Kingdom,'23 in
which the European Court of Human Rights held that since
there was a real risk of Chahal being subjected to treatment con-
trary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
if he were returned to India, the U.K. order for his deportation
to India would, if executed, give rise to a violation of Article 3.
Chahal was an Indian Sikh who had entered the United
Kingdom illegally and had been detained for deportation, but
feared for his safety if returned to India, because of his earlier
Sikh separatist activities. He complained to the European Com-
mission of Human Rights. They concluded that his deportation
would result in violation of Article 3.124 The European Commis-
sion of Human Rights stressed that "the guarantees of Article 3
are of an absolute character, permitting no exception." 25
The European Court of Human Rights referred to its "well
established" case law on Article 3 that "where substantial
grounds have been shown for believing that the person in ques-
tion, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected to
treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country," there is
an implied obligation not to expel the person in question to that
country. 126 The court stated that "[i]t should not be inferred
from the Court's remarks [about] the risk of undermining the
foundations of extradition" in the Soeringjudgment "that there is
any room for balancing the risk of ill-treatment against the rea-
sons for expulsion in determining whether a State's responsibil-
121. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, GA. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR,
39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified
in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
122. Id. art. 3(1), 1465 U.N.T.S. at 114.
123. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1997).
124. Id. at 446.
125. Id. at 443.
126. Id. at 455.
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ity under Article 3 is engaged."1 27 It assessed Chahal's risk of ill-
treatment, and, rejecting the U.K. arguments based on its secur-
ity considerations, and, notwithstanding India's assurances, con-
cluded that the contemplated deportation to India would be a
violation of Article 3.28
CONCLUSION
The practice of refusing international extradition requests
on the ground of torture has become customary in international
law. The death penalty, however, raises debatable issues. In any
event, the trend toward abolition of the death penalty is clear.
Consequently, the United States will increasingly confront diffi-
culties in obtaining extradition of fugitives from the European
states and Canada. Abducting the criminals and taking them
back to the United States for trial is not an appropriate re-
sponse. 2 Although the United States has entered into several
bilateral treaties, which contain clauses allowing a country to ask
for an assurance that the death penalty will not be imposed, 30
even if there is no provision for such assurances to be given, in
the interest of comity the United States should show sensitivity
for other countries' values on this very fundamental issue and
voluntarily give those assurances.
127. Id. at 457.
128. Id. at 458-64.
129. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that re-
spondent's forcible abduction does not prohibit his trial in U.S. court for violation of
criminal laws of United States); see also Mary K. Martin, A One-Way Ticket Back to the
United States: The Collision of International Extradition Law and the Death Penalty, 11 CAP.
DEF. J. 243 (1999).
130. See Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K., art. 4, 28 U.S.T. 227, 230; Ex-
tradition Treaty, Oct. 13, 1983, U.S.-Italy, art. 9, 35 U.S.T. 3023, 3031; U.S.-Canada Ex-
tradition Treaty, supra note 54, art. 6, 27 U.S.T. at 989.
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